Let V be a set of n points in R d , called voters. A point p ∈ R d is a plurality point for V when the following holds: for every q ∈ R d the number of voters closer to p than to q is at least the number of voters closer to q than to p. Thus, in a vote where each v ∈ V votes for the nearest proposal (and voters for which the proposals are at equal distance abstain), proposal p will not lose against any alternative proposal q. For most voter sets a plurality point does not exist. We therefore introduce the concept of β-plurality points, which are defined similarly to regular plurality points except that the distance of each voter to p (but not to q) is scaled by a factor β, for some constant 0 < β 1. We investigate the existence and computation of β-plurality points, and obtain the following results.
Introduction
Background. Voting theory is concerned with mechanisms to combine preferences of individual voters into a collective decision. A desirable property of such a collective decision is that it is stable, in the sense that no alternative is preferred by more voters. In spatial voting games [5, 10] this is formalized as follows; see to p than to q. Thus a point p ∈ R d represents a stable decision for a given finite set V of voters if, for any alternative q ∈ R d , we have {v ∈ V : |vp| < |vq|} {v ∈ V : |vq| < |vp|} . Such a point p is called a plurality point. 1 For d = 1, a plurality point always exists, since in R 1 a median of V is a plurality point. This is not true in higher dimensions, however. Define a median hyperplane for a set V of voters to be a hyperplane h such that both open half-spaces defined by h contain fewer than |V |/2 voters. For d 2 a plurality point in R d exists if and only if all median hyperplanes for V meet in a common point; see Fig. 1 (ii). This condition is known as generalized Plott symmetry conditions [12, 23] ; see also the papers by Wu et al. [28] and de Berg et al. [4] , who present algorithms to determine the existence of a plurality point for a given set of voters.
It is very unlikely that voters are distributed in such a way that all median hyperplanes have a common intersection. (Indeed, if this happens, then a slightest generic perturbation of a single voter destroys the existence of the plurality point.) When a plurality point does not exist, we may want to find a point that is close to being a plurality point. One way to formalize this is to consider the center of the yolk (or plurality ball) of V , where the yolk [14, 17, 20, 22] is the smallest ball intersecting every median hyperplane of V . We introduce β-plurality points as an alternative way to relax the requirements for a plurality point, and study several combinatorial and algorithmic questions regarding β-plurality points.
β-Plurality points: definition and main questions. Let V be a multiset 2 of n voters in R d in arbitrary, possibly coinciding, positions. In the traditional setting a proposed point p ∈ R d wins a voter v ∈ V against an alternative q if |pv| < |qv|. We relax this by fixing a parameter β with 0 < β 1 and letting p win v against q if β · |pv| < |qv|. Thus we give an advantage to the initial proposal p by scaling distances to p by a factor β 1. We now define V [p β q] := {v ∈ V : β · |pv| < |qv|} and V [p ≺ β q] := {v ∈ V : β · |pv| > |qv|} 1 One can also require p to be strictly more popular than any alternative q. This is sometimes called a strong plurality point, in contrast to the weak plurality points that we consider. 2 Even though we allow V to be a multiset, we sometimes refer to it as a "set" to ease the reading. When the fact that V is a multiset requires special treatment, we explicitly address this.
to be the multisets of voters won by p over q and lost by p against q, respectively. Finally, we say that a point p ∈ R d is a β-plurality point for V when
Observe that β-plurality is monotone in the sense that if p is a β-plurality point then p is also a β -plurality point for all β < β. The spatial voting model was popularised by Black [5] and Down [10] in the 1950s. Stokes [26] criticized its simplicity and was the first to highlight the importance of taking non-spatial aspects into consideration. The reasoning is that voters may evaluate a candidate not only on their policies-their position in the policy space-but also take their so-called valence into account: charisma, competence, or other desirable qualities in the public's mind [13] . A candidate can also increase her valence by a stronger party support [27] or campaign spending [18] . Several models have been proposed to bring the spatial model closer to a more realistic voting approach; see [15, 16, 24] as examples. A common model is the multiplicative model, introduced by Hollard and Rossignol [19] , which is closely related to the concept of a β-plurality point. The multiplicative model augments the existing spatial utility function by scaling the candidate's valence by a multiplicative factor. Note that in the 2-player game considered in this paper the multiplicative model is the same as our β-plurality model. From a computational point of view very little is known about the multiplicative model. We are only aware of a result by Chung [7] , who studied the problem of positioning a new candidate in an existing space of voters and candidates, so that the valence required to win at least a given number of voters is minimized.
One reason for introducing β-plurality was that a set V of voters in R d , for d 2, generally does not admit a plurality point. This immediately raises the question: Is it true that, for β small enough, any set V admits a β-plurality point? If so, we want to know the largest β such that any voter set V admits a β-plurality point, that is, we wish to determine β * d := sup{β : any finite multiset V in R d admits a β-plurality point}.
Note that β * 1 = 1, since any set V in R 1 admits a plurality point and 1-plurality is equivalent to the traditional notion of plurality.
After studying this combinatorial problem in Section 2, we turn our attention to the following algorithmic question: given a voter set V , find a point p that is a β-plurality point for the largest possible value β. In other words, if we define β(V ) := sup{β : V admits a β-plurality point} and β(p, V ) := sup{β : p is a β-plurality point for V } then we want to find a point p such that β(p, V ) = β(V ).
Outline. In Section 2 we prove that β * d √ 3/2 for all d 2. To this end we first show that β * d is non-increasing in d, and then we exhibit a voter set V in R 2 such that β(V ) √ 3/2. We also show how to construct, for any given V in R 2 , a ( √ 3/2)-plurality point, thus proving that β * 2 = √ 3/2. For d 3 we show how to construct a (1/ √ d)-plurality point. In Section 3 we study the problem of computing, for a given voter set V of n points in R d , a β-plurality point for the largest possible β. (Here we assume d to be a fixed constant.)
While such a point can be found in polynomial time, the resulting running time is quite high. We therefore focus our attention on finding an approximately optimal point p, that is, a point p such that β(p, V ) (1 − ε) · β(V ). We show that such a point can be computed in O( n 2 ε 3d−2 · log n ε d−1 · log 2 1 ε ) time.
Notation.
We denote the open ball of radius ρ centered at a point q ∈ R d by B(q, ρ) and, for a point p ∈ R d and a voter v, we define D β (p, v) := B(v, β · |pv|). Observe that p wins v against a competitor q if and only if q is strictly outside
we assume V is clear from the context-and let A(D β (p)) denote the arrangement induced by D β (p). The competitor point q that wins the most voters against p will thus lie in the cell of A(D β (p)) of the greatest depth or, more precisely, the cell contained in the maximum number of disks D β (p, v).
Bounds on β * d
In this section we will prove bounds on β * d , the supremum of all β such that any finite set V ⊂ R d admits a β-plurality point. We start with an observation that allows us to apply bounds on β * d to those on β * d for d > d. Let conv(V ) denote the convex hull of V .
Proof. Note that for every point r ∈ conv(V ) there is a point r ∈ conv(V ) that lies strictly closer to all voters in V , namely the point r ∈ ∂conv(V ) closest to r . This immediately implies part (i): if p is beaten by some point q ∈ conv(V ) then p is certainly beaten by a point q ∈ conv(V ) that lies strictly closer to all voters in V than q. It also immediately implies part (ii), because if a point p lies strictly closer to all voters in V than a point p , then β(p, V ) > β(p , V ). To prove part (iii), let V ∈ R d be a voter set such that β(V ) = β * d . Now embed V into R d , say in the flat x d+1 = · · · = x d = 0, obtaining a set V . Then β(V ) = β(V ) by parts (i) and (ii). Hence,
We can now prove an upper bound on β * d .
Proof. By Observation 2.1(iii), it suffices to prove the lemma for d = 2. To this end let V = {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 } consist of three voters that form an equilateral triangle ∆ of side length 2 in R 2 ; see Fig. 2 (i). Let p denote the center of ∆. We will first argue that β(p, V ) = √ 3/2. Note that |pv i | = 2/ √ 3 for all three voters v i . Hence, for β = √ 3/2, the open balls D β (v i , p) are pairwise disjoint and touching at the mid-points of the edges of ∆. Therefore any competitor q either wins one voter and loses the remaining two, or wins no voter and loses at least one. The former happens when q lies inside one of the three balls D β (v i , p); the later happens when q does not lie inside any of the balls, because in that case q can be on the boundary of at most two of the balls. Thus, for β = √ 3/2, the point p always wins more voters than q v1 v2 v3 does. On the other hand, for β > √ 3/2, any two balls D β (v i , p), D β (v j , p) intersect and so a point q located in such a pairwise intersection wins two voters and beats p. We conclude that β(p, V ) = √ 3/2, as claimed. The lemma now follows if we can show that β(p , V ) √ 3/2 for any p = p. Let Vor(V ) be the Voronoi diagram of V , and let V(v i ) be the closed Voronoi cell of v i , as shown in Fig. 2 (ii). Assume without loss of generality that p lies in V(v 3 ). Let E be the ellipse with foci v 1 and v 2 that passes through p. Thus
Note that E is tangent to V(v 3 ) at the point p. Hence, any point p
there is a competitor q that wins two voters against p , which implies β(p , V ) √ 3/2 and thus finishes the proof of the lemma.
We now prove lower bounds on β * d . We first prove that β * d 1/ √ d for any d 2, and then we improve the lower bound to √ 3/2 for d = 2. The latter bound is tight by Lemma 2.2.
Let V be a finite multiset of n voters in R d . We call a hyperplane h balanced with respect to V , if both open half-spaces defined by h contain at most n/2 voters from V . Note the difference with median hyperplanes, which are required to have fewer than n/2 voters in both open half-spaces. Clearly, for any 1 i d there is a balanced hyperplane orthogonal to the x i -axis, namely the hyperplane x i = m i , where m i is a median in the multiset of all x i -coordinates of the voters in V . (In fact, for any direction d there is a balanced hyperplane orthogonal to d.)
Proof. Let H := {h 1 , . . . , h d } be a set of balanced hyperplanes with respect to V such that h i is orthogonal to the x i -axis, and assume without loss of generality that h i : x i = 0. We will prove that the point p located at the origin is a β-plurality point for V for any β < 1/ √ d, thus showing that β(p, V ) 1/ √ d. Let q = (q 1 , . . . , q d ) be any competitor of p. We can assume without loss of generality that max 1 i d |q i | = q d > 0. Thus q lies in the closed cone C + d defined as
Note that C + d is bounded by portions of the 2(d − 1) hyperplanes x d = ±x j with j = d; see 
Proof. For any point
First, we prove that sin(∠qpv) = 1/ √ d if q lies on an edge e of C + d and v lies on the orthogonal projection e of e onto h d . Assume without loss of generality that e is the edge of C + d defined by the intersection of the d − 1 hyperplanes x d = x j , so that q 1 = · · · = q d−1 = q d . Since ∠qpv is the same for any v ∈ e, we may assume that v is the orthogonal projection of q to h d , which means |qv| = q d . We then have
Now assume the condition for equality does not hold. Let ρ be the ray starting at p and containing q, and let ρ be its orthogonal projection onto h d . We have two cases: v ∈ ρ but q is not contained in an edge of C + d , or v ∈ ρ. In the former case we may, as before, assume that v is the projection of q onto h d .
In the latter case, let be the line containing p and v, and let v be the point on closest to q. Then |qv| |qv | > |qq|, where q is the projection of q onto h d , and so
We can now use the Law of Sines and the claim above to derive that for any β < 1/
Hence, p wins every point in cl(h − d ). This proves the first part of the lemma since cl(h − d ) contains at least n/2 voters, as already remarked.
Computing the point p is trivial once we have the balanced hyperplanes h i , which can be found in O(n) time by computing a median x i -coordinate for each 1 i d.
In R 2 we can improve the above bound: for any voter set V in the plane we can find a point p such that β(p, V ) = √ 3/2. By Lemma 2.2 this bound is tight. The improvement is based on Lemma 2.4 below. This lemma -in fact a stronger version, stating that any two opposite cones defined by the three concurrent lines contain the same number of points-has been proved for even n by Dumitrescu et al. [11] . Our proof of Lemma 2.4 is similar to their proof. We give it because we also need it for odd n, and because we will need an understanding of the proof to describe our algorithm for computing the concurrent triple in the lemma. Our algorithm will run in O(n log 2 n) time, a significant improvement over the O(n 4/3 log 1+ε n) running time obtained (for the case of even n) by Dumitrescu et al. [11] . Lemma 2.4. Given a multiset V of n voters in R 2 , there exists a triple of concurrent balanced lines ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) such that the smaller angle between any two of them is π 3 . Proof. Define the orientation of a line to be the counterclockwise angle it makes with the positive y-axis. Recall that for any given orientation θ there exists at least one balanced line with orientation θ. When n is odd this line is unique: it passes through the median of the voter set V when V is projected orthogonally onto a line orthogonal to the lines of orientation θ. In the rest of the proof it will be convenient to have a unique balanced line for any orientation θ. To achieve this when n is even, we simply delete an arbitrary voter from V . (If there are other voters at the same location, these voters are not deleted.) This is allowed because when |V | is even, a balanced line for V \ {v} is also a balanced line for V . Now let µ be the function that maps an angle value θ to the unique balanced line µ(θ); see Figure 4 (i). Note that µ is continuous for 0 θ < π.
be the intersection point between i (θ) and j (θ). If p 23 (0) ∈ 1 (0) then the lines 1 (0), 2 (0), 3 (0) are concurrent and we are done. Otherwise, consider the situation at θ = 0 and imagine 1 (0) and 2 (0) to be directed in the positive y-direction, as in Fig. 4 (ii). Clearly, if p 23 (0) is to the left of the directed line 1 (0) then p 13 (0) is to the right of the directed line 2 (0), and vice versa. Now increase θ from 0 to π/3, and note that 1 (π/3) = 2 (0) and p 23 (π/3) = p 13 (0). Hence, p 23 (θ) lies to a different side of the directed line 1 (θ) for θ = 0 than it does for θ = π/3. Since both To find a concurrent triple of balanced lines, we first compute the lines 1 (0), 2 (0), 3 (0) in O(n) time. If they are concurrent, we are done. Otherwise, there is a θ ∈ (0, π/3) such that 1 (θ), 2 (θ), 3 (θ) are concurrent. To find this value θ, we dualize the voter set V , using the standard duality transform that maps a point (a, b) to the line y = ax + b, and vice versa. Let v * denote the dual line of the voter v, and let V * := {v * : v ∈ V }. Note that, for θ ∈ (0, π/3), the lines 1 (θ), 2 (θ), 3 (θ) are all non-vertical, therefore their duals * i (θ) are well-defined.
Consider the arrangement A(V * ) defined by the duals of the voters. For θ = 0, define slope(θ) to be the slope of the lines with orientation θ. Then µ * (θ), the dual of µ(θ), is the intersection point of the vertical line x = slope(θ) with L med , the median level in A(V * ). (The median level of A(V * ) is the set of points q such that there are fewer than n/2 lines below q and fewer than n/2 lines above q; this is well defined since we assume n is odd. The median level forms an x-monotone polygonal curve along edges of A(V * ).)
Now consider the duals *
. We split L med into three pieces corresponding to these ranges of x-coordinate. Let E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 denote the sets of edges forming the parts of L med in the first, second, and third range, respectively, where edges crossing the vertical lines x = −1/ √ 3 and x = 1/ √ 3 are split; see Fig. 5 . Recall that we want to find a value θ ∈ (0, π/3) such that 1 (θ), 2 (θ), 3 (θ) are concurrent (or, in other words, such that the points * 1 (θ), * 2 (θ), * 3 (θ) are collinear). Also recall that, for any θ ∈ (0, π/3), the point * i (θ) lies on an edge in E i , for i = 1, 2, 3. One way to find θ would be to explicitly compute L med , and then increase θ (starting at θ = 0) and see how the points * i (θ) move over E i , until we reach a value where 1 (θ), 2 (θ), 3 (θ) are concurrent. Since the best known bounds on the complexity of the median level is O(n 4/3 ) [9] we will proceed differently, as follows. 1. Find an interval (θ 1 , θ 1 ) ⊆ (0, π/3) for which there is a θ with the desired properties and such that * 1 (θ) lies on the same edge of E 1 for all θ ∈ (θ 1 , θ 1 ).
2.
Find an interval (θ 2 , θ 2 ) ⊆ (θ 1 , θ 1 ) for which there is a θ with the desired properties and such that * 2 (θ) lies on the same edge of E 2 for all θ ∈ (θ 2 , θ 2 ). 3. Find an interval (θ 3 , θ 3 ) ⊆ (θ 2 , θ 2 ) for which there is a θ with the desired properties and such that * 3 (θ) lies on the same edge of E 3 for all θ ∈ (θ 3 , θ 3 ). 4. After Step 3 we have an interval (θ 3 , θ 3 ) ⊆ (0, π/3) for which there is a θ with the desired properties and such that * 1 (θ), * 2 (θ), and * 3 (θ) each lie on a fixed edge of L med . Let v 1 , v 2 , and v 3 denote the voters whose dual lines contain these three edges. We know that for any θ ∈ (θ 3 , θ 3 ), the line through v 1 with orientation θ is a balanced line. Similarly, for any θ ∈ (θ 3 , θ 3 ) the line through v 2 with orientation θ + π/3 is a balanced line, and the line through v 3 with orientation θ + 2π/3 is a balanced line. Finding a θ ∈ (θ 3 , θ 3 ) with the desired properties thus only requires finding a θ ∈ (θ 3 , θ 3 ) for which these three lines are concurrent. Such a θ is guaranteed to exist by construction, and finding it is a constant-time operation.
Figure 5
The edge sets E1, E2, and E3 of L med , the median level in A(V * ).
It remains to explain how to perform Steps 1-3. Below we describe this for Step 1; the other steps can be implemented in a similar way. To implement Step 1 we perform a binary search over the x-coordinates of the vertices of A(V * ) in the slab (−∞, −1/ √ 3) × (−∞, ∞), as follows. In a generic step of this binary search we have an interval (θ min , θ max ) such that p 23 (θ) lies to a different side of the directed line 1 (θ) for θ = θ min than for θ = θ max . (Recall that this implies that there is a θ ∈ (θ min , θ max ) with the desired property.) This interval corresponds to the slab (slope(θ min ), slope(θ max ))×(−∞, ∞) in the dual plane. Let X be the set of x-coordinates of the vertices of A(V * ) inside this slab. We can find the median x med of X in O(n log n) time using the algorithm by Cole et al. [8] . We then compute the three balanced lines i (θ med ), where θ med is such that slope(θ med ) = x med . If these three lines are concurrent we are immediately done, and we can stop. Otherwise we determine where p 23 (θ med ) lies relative to 1 (θ med ), and based on that decide whether to recurse on (θ min , θ med ) or on (θ med , θ max ). We continue until the slab (slope(θ min ), slope(θ max )) × (−∞, ∞) contains no more vertices of A(V * ). We then finish Step 1 by setting (θ 1 , θ 1 ) := (θ min , θ max ).
Each iteration of the binary search takes O(n log n) time, so Step 1 takes O(n log 2 n) time. Steps 2 and 3 can be done in a similar fashion, so we can find a concurrent triple of balanced lines as in Lemma 2.4 in O(n log 2 n) time. Next we show that the common intersection of these three lines is a ( √ 3/2)-plurality point, thus proving the following lemma. Proof. Let p be the intersection point of three concurrent balanced lines as described in Lemma 2.4-as described above we can compute these lines in O(n log 2 n) time-and let q be a competitor. The three lines partition the plane into six equal-sized sectors, which we number S 1 through S 6 in a clockwise fashion, so that q lies in the closure of S 
Finding a point that maximizes β(p, V )
We know from Theorem 2.6 that, for any multiset V of n voters in R d , we can compute a point p with β(p, V ) ≥ 1/ √ d (even with β(p, V ) ≥ √ 3/2, in the plane). However, a given voter multiset V may admit a β-plurality point for larger values of β-possibly even for β = 1. In this section we study the problem of computing a point p that maximizes β(p, V ), that is, a point p with β(p, V ) = β(V ).
An exact algorithm
Below we sketch an exact algorithm to compute β(V ) together with a point p such that β(p, V ) = β(V ). Our goal is to show that, for constant d, this can be done in polynomial time. We do not make a special effort to optimize the exponent in the running time; it may be possible to speed up the algorithm, but it seems clear that it will remain impractical, because of the asymptotic running time, and also because of algebraic issues.
Note that we can efficiently check whether a true plurality point exists (i.e., β = 1 can be achieved) in time O(n log n) by an algorithm of De Berg et al. [4] , and if so, identify this point. Therefore, hereafter β = 1 is used as a sentinel value, and our algorithm proceeds on the assumption that β(p, V ) < 1 for any point p. . For f v (p, q) = 1 this is not quite true: when p = q = v we always have a tie, and when |pv| < |qv| then p wins v even when β = f v (p, q) = 1. When p = q there is a tie for all voters, so the final conclusion (namely that V
is still correct. The fact that we incorrectly conclude that there is a tie when |pv| < |qv| and β = f v (p, q) = 1 does not present a problem either, since we assume β(p, V ) < 1. Hence, we can pretend that checking if β > f v (p, q) , or β = f v (p, q), or β < f v (p, q) tells us whether q wins v, or there's a tie, or p wins v, respectively.
Hereafter we identify
v be the set of points lying above this graph, and f − v be the set of points lying below it. Thus f + v is precisely the set of combinations of (p, q, β) where q wins v over p, while f v is the set where p ties with q, and f − v is the set where q loses v to p. Consider the arrangement A := A(F ) defined by the set of surfaces F := {f v : v ∈ V }. Each face C in A is a maximal connected set of points with the property that all points of C are contained in, lie below, or lie above, the same subset of surfaces of F . (Note that we consider faces of all dimensions, not just full-dimensional cells.) Thus for all (p, q, β) ∈ C, exactly one of the following holds:
that is, such that p loses against q for all (p, q, β) in C. We can construct A and L in time O(n 2d+1 ) using standard machinery, as A is an arrangement of degree-4 semi-algebraic surfaces of constant description complexity [2, 3] . We are interested in the set
What is the relationship between W and L? A point (p, β) is in W precisely when, for every choice of q ∈ R d , p wins at least as many voters as q (for the given β). In other words,
That is, W is the complement of the projection of L to the space R d+1 representing the pairs (p, β). The most straightforward way to implement the projection would involve constructing semi-algebraic formulas describing individual faces and invoking quantifier elimination on the resulting formulas [2] . Below we outline a more obviously polynomial-time alternative.
Construct the vertical decomposition vd(A) of A, which is a refinement of A into pieces ("subfaces" τ ), each bounded by at most 2(2d + 1) surfaces of constant degree and therefore of constant complexity; see Appendix A. A vertical decomposition is specified by ordering the coordinates-we put the coordinates corresponding to q last. Since vd(A) is a refinement of A, the set L is the union of subfaces τ of vd(A) fully contained in L. Since A is an arrangement of n well-behaved surfaces in 2d + 1 5 dimensions, the complexity of vd(A) is O(n 2(2d+1)−4+ε ) = O(n 4d−2+ε ), for any ε > 0 [21] . In particular, L comprises := O(n 4d−2+ε ) subfaces.
Since each τ ⊂ L is a subface of the vertical decomposition vd(A) in which the last d coordinates correspond to q, the projection τ of τ to R d+1 is easy obtain (see Appendix A) in constant time; indeed it can be obtained by discarding the constraints on these last d coordinates from the description of τ . Thus, in time O( ) we can construct the family of all the projections of the subfaces of L, each a constant-complexity semi-algebraic object in R d+1 . We now construct the arrangement A of the resulting collection and its vertical decomposition vd(A ). The complexity of vd(A ) is either O( d+1+ε ) or O( 2(d+1)−4+ε ) = O( 2d−2+ε ), depending on whether d + 1 4 or not, respectively [21] . Each subface in vd(A ) is either fully contained in the projection of L or fully disjoint from it. Collecting all of the latter subfaces, we obtain a representation of W as a union of at most O( O(d) ) = O(n O(d 2 ) ) constant-complexity semi-algebraic objects. Now if (p, β) ∈ W is the point with the highest value of β, then β(V ) = β(p, V ) = β. It can be found by enumerating all the subfaces of vd(A ) contained in the closure of W -we take the closure because V (p, β) is defined as a supremum-and identifying their topmost point or points. Since each face has constant complexity, this can be done in O(1) time per subface. 3 This completes our description of an O(n O(d 2 ) )-time algorithm to compute the best β that can be achieved for a given set of voters V , and the candidate p (or the set of candidates) that achieve this value.
An approximation algorithm
Since computing β(V ) exactly appears expensive, we now turn our attention to approximation algorithms. In particular, given a voter set V in R d and an ε ∈ (0, 1/2], we wish to compute a point p such that β(p, V ) (1 − ε) · β(V ).
Our approximation algorithm works in two steps. In the first step, we compute a set P of O(n/ε 2d−1 log(1/ε)) candidates. P may not contain the true optimal point p, but we will ensure that P contains a point p such that β(p, V ) (1 − ε/2) · β(V ). In the second step, we approximate β(p , V ) for each p ∈ P , to find an approximately best candidate.
Constructing the candidate set P . To construct the candidate set P , we will generate, for each voter v i ∈ V , a set P i of O(1/ε 2d−1 log(1/ε)) candidate points. Our final set P of candidates will be the union of the sets P 1 , . . . , P n . Next we describe how to construct P i . Partition R d into a set C of O(1/ε d−1 ) simplicial cones with apex at v i and opening angle ε/(2 √ d), so that for every pair of points u and u in the same cone we have ∠uv i u ε/(2 √ d). We assume for simplicity (and can easily guarantee) that no voter in V lies on the boundary of any of the cones, except for v i itself and any voters coinciding with v i . Let C(v i ) denote vi radius = dc/ε 6 (i) The closed spherical shell Ai(C) defined by the two balls of radii ε · dC and dC /ε around vi. (ii) The exponential grid Gi(C). The grid is defined by a collection of spheres centered at vi, plus extreme rays of the cones with apex at vi. The spheres have radii (1 + ε/4) i · ε · dC for 0 i log (1+ε/4) (1/ε 2 ) = O((1/ε) log(1/ε)), and the interior angle of a cone is ε/2 √ d.
the set of all cones in C whose interior contains at least one voter. For each cone C ∈ C(v i ) we generate a candidate set G i (C) as explained next, and then we set P i := C∈C(vi) G i (C)∪{v i }. Let d C be the distance from v i to the nearest other voter (not coinciding with v i ) in C. Let A i (C) be the closed spherical shell defined by the two spheres of radii ε · d C and d C /ε around v i , as shown in Fig. 6(i) . The open ball of radius ε · d C is denoted by A in i (C), and the complement of the closed ball of radius d C /ε is denoted by A out i (C). Let G i (C) be the vertices in an exponential grid defined by a collection of spheres centered at v i , and the extreme rays of the cones in C; see Fig. 6 (ii). The spheres have radii (1 + ε/4) i · ε · d C , for 0 i log (1+ε/4) (1/ε 2 ) = O((1/ε) log(1/ε)). Observe that G i (C) contains not only points in C, but in the entire spherical shell A i (C). The set G i (C) consists of O(1/ε d log(1/ε)) points, and it has the following property:
Let p be any point in the spherical shell A i (C), and let p be a corner of the grid cell containing p and nearest to p. Then |p p| ε · |pv i |.
( * )
To prove the property, let q be the point on pv i such that |qv i | = |p v i |. From the construction of the exponential grid we have |pq| ε 4 ·|pv i |. Since p and q lie in the same cone ∠p v i q
and, consequently, |p q| ε 2 · |qv i | (1 + ε 4 ) · ε 2 · |pv i |. The property is now immediate since |pp | |pq| + |qp | < ε · |pv i |.
As mentioned above, P i := C∈C(vi) G i (C) ∪ {v i }, and the final candidate set P is defined as P := vi∈V P i . Computing the sets P i is easy: for each of the O(1/ε d−1 ) cones C ∈ C(v i ), determine the nearest neighbor of v i in C in O(n) time by brute force, and then generate G i (C) in O((1/ε (d−1) ) log(1/ε)) time. (It is not hard to speed up the nearestneighbor computation using appropriate data structures, but this will not improve the final running time in Theorem 3.4.) We obtain the following lemma. The next lemma is crucial to show that P is a good candidate set. Proof. Let v i be a voter nearest to p. We will argue that the set P i contains a point p with the desired property. We distinguish three cases.
Case I: There is a cone C ∈ C(v i ) such that p lies in the spherical shell A i (C). In this case we pick p to be a point of G i (C) nearest to p, that is, p is a corner nearest to p of the grid cell containing p. By property ( * ) we have
where the last inequality follows from the fact that v i is a voter nearest to p.
Case II: Point p lies in A in i (C) for all C ∈ C(v i ). In this case we pick p := v i . Clearly |p v j | = 0 (1 + ε) · |pv j | for j = i. For j = i, we argue as follows. Let C ∈ C(v i ) be the cone containing v j . Since we are in Case II we know that p ∈ A in i (C), and so
Moreover, we have
where the last step uses that ε 1/2 and d C |p v j |. Combining (1) and (2), we obtain |p v j | (1 + 2ε) · |pv j |.
Case III: Cases I and II do not apply. In this case there is at least one cone C such that p ∈ A out i (C). Of all such cones, let C * be the one whose associated distance d C * is maximized. Let p be the point on the segment pv i at distance d C /ε from v i . Without loss of generality, we will assume that p and v i only differ in the x d coordinate; see Fig. 7 (i).
We will prove that the point p of G i (C * ) nearest to p (refer to Fig. 7(i) ) has the desired property. Consider a voter v j . We distinguish three cases.
When i = j, then we have
where the second inequality follows from ( * ).
When v j lies in a cone C such that p ∈ A in i (C), then we can use the same argument as in Case II to show that |p v j | (1 + 2ε) · |pv j |.
In the remaining case v j lies in a cone C such that p ∈ A out i (C). Let v k be a voter in C nearest to v i . Since |v i v k | = d C , |pv i | d C /ε, and |pv k | |pv i |, we can deduce that ∠pv i v k π/2 − ε/2, as illustrated in Fig. 7 (ii). Furthermore, since v k and v j belong to the same cone C the angle ∠v k v i v j is bounded by ε/2 √ d ε/2 according to the construction. Putting the two angle bounds together we conclude that ∠pv i v j π 2 − ε. Now consider the triangle defined by p, v i and v j . From the Law of Sines we obtain
for ε < 1/2. Since p lies on the line between p and v i we have:
Finally we get the claimed bound by noting that |p p | ε · |p v i | (from (*)),
An approximate decision algorithm. Given a point p, a positive real value ε and the voter multiset V , we say that an algorithm Alg is an ε-approximate decision algorithm if Alg answers yes if p is a β-plurality point, and Alg answers no if p is not a (1 − ε)β-plurality point. In the remaining cases, where (1 − ε)β < β(p, V ) < β, Alg may answer yes or no.
Next we propose an ε-approximate decision algorithm Alg. The algorithm will use the so-called Balanced Box-Decomposition (BBD) tree introduced by Arya and Mount [1] . BBD trees are hierarchical space-decomposition trees such that each node µ represents a region in R d , denoted by region(µ), which is a d-dimensional axis-aligned box or the difference of two such boxes. A BBD tree for a set P of n points in R d can be built in O(n log n) time using O(n) space. It supports (1 + ε)-approximate range counting queries with convex query ranges in O(log n + ε 1−d ) time [1] . In our algorithm all query ranges will be balls, hence a (1 + ε)-approximate range-counting query for a d-dimensional ball s(v, r) with center at v and radius r returns an integer I such that |P ∩ s(v, r)| I |P ∩ s(v, (1 + ε)r)|.
Our ε-approximate decision algorithm Alg works as follows. 1. Construct a set Q of O(n/ε d−1 ) potential candidates competing against p, as follows.
Let Q(v) be a set of O(1/ε d−1 ) points distributed uniformly on the boundary of the ball s(v, (1 − ε/2) · β · |pv|), such that the distance between any point on the boundary and its nearest neighbor in Q(v) is at most ε
In the last step we use the fact that β 1/ √ d, according to Lemma 2.3. Set Q := Q(v 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ Q(v n ). To prove correctness of the algorithm we define, for a given γ > 0, a fuzzy ball s γ (v, r) to be any set such that r) , and otherwise q may or may not be inside in s γ (v, r). We now observe that for each voter v i ∈ V there is a fuzzy ball s ε/4 (v 1 , (1−ε/4)·β ·|pv i |) such that the value C(µ) for a leaf µ storing a point q is the depth of q in the arrangement, denoted by A ε/4 (V, 1 − ε/4), of the fuzzy balls s ε/4 (v 1 , (1 − ε/4) · β · |pv 1 |), . . . , s ε/4 (v n , (1 − ε/4) · β · |pv|). Proof. We start by analyzing the running time of the algorithm. Constructing the set of points in Q can be done in time linear in |Q|, while building the BBD-tree T requires O((n/ε d−1 ) log(n/ε d−1 )) time [1, Lemma 1]. Next, the algorithm performs n approximate range queries, each requiring O(log n ε d−1 + 1 ε d−1 ) time [1, Theorem 2] ). Note that the small modification we made to the query algorithm to update the counters does not increase the asymptotic running time. Finally, the traversal of T to compute C takes time linear in the size of T , which is O(n/ε d−1 ).
It remains to prove that Alg is correct.
If p is a plurality point there can be no point q ∈ R d having depth greater than n/2 in the arrangement of the balls s(v 1 , β · |pv|), . . . , s(v n , β · |pv|). Since s ε/4 (v, (1 − ε/4) · β · |pv|) ⊂ s(v, β · |pv|), for all v, Alg could not have found a point with depth greater than n/2, and hence, must return yes.
If p is not a (1−ε)β-plurality point, then there exists a point q with depth greater than n/2 in the arrangement A(V, 1 − ε) of the balls s(v 1 , (1 − ε) · β · |pv|), . . . , s(v n , (1 − ε) · β · |pv|). Let q be the point in Q nearest to q. We claim that for any ball s(v, (1 − ε) · β · |pv|) that contains q, its expanded version s(v, (1 − ε/4) · β · |pv|) contains q . Of course, if s(v, (1 − ε) · β · |pv|) contains q then we are done. Otherwise, let x be the point whereintersects the boundary of s(v, (1 − ε) · β · |pv|); see Fig. 8 . Note that q must also be the point in Q nearest to x.
Let x be the point on the boundary of s(v, (1 − ε/2) · β · |pv|) nearest to x, and let q be a point in Q on the boundary of s(v, (1 − ε/2) · β · |pv|). By construction, we have |xx | = ε 4 · β · |pv| and |x q | ε 4 · β · |pv| and, by the triangle inequality, we obtain |xq | |xq | |xx | + |x q | ε 2 · β · |pv|.
This implies that s(v, (1 − ε/4) · β · |pv|) ⊆ s ε/4 (v, (1 − ε/4) · β · |pv|) must contain q . Consequently, if q has depth at least n/2 in A(V, 1 − ε) then q has depth at least n/2 in the arrangement A ε/4 (V, (1 − ε/4)), and hence, the algorithm will return no.
The algorithm. Now we have the tools required to approximate β(V ). First, generate the set P of O( n ε 2d−1 log 1 ε ) candidate points. For each candidate point p ∈ P , perform a binary search for an approximate β * (p) in the interval [1/ √ d, 1], until the remaining search interval has length at most ε/2 · 1/ √ d. For each p and β * , (ε/2)-approximately decide if p is a β * -plurality point in V . Return the largest β * and the corresponding point p on which the algorithm says yes. Theorem 3.4. Given a multiset V of voters in R d , a ((1 − ε) · β(V ))-plurality point can be computed in O( n 2 ε 3d−2 · log n ε d−1 · log 2 1 ε ).
Concluding Remarks
We proved that any finite set of voters in R d admits a β-plurality point for β = 1/ √ d and that some sets require β = √ 3/2. For d = 2 we managed to close the gap by showing that β * 2 = √ 3/2. One of the main open problems is to close the gap for d > 2. We also presented an approximation algorithm that finds, for a given V , a (1 − ε) · β(V )-plurality point. The algorithm runs in O * (n 2 /ε 3d−2 ) time. Another open problem is whether a subquadratic approximation algorithm exists, and to prove lower bounds on the time to compute β(V ) or β(p, V ) exactly. Finally, it will be interesting to study β-plurality points in other metrics, for instance in the personalized L 1 -metric [4] for d > 2.
